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Summary findings
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China's rural economy have not been properly reflected  explanations for rising inequality. Nonfarm income was
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when market-based valuation methods are used and  inequality over time, as did private transfers.
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Prod-uced  by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterWhen  Economic  Reform  is Faster than Statistical Reform:
Measuring and Explaining  Income Inequality  in Rural China
Martin Ravallion and Shaohua Chen1  Introduction
There is a widespread view that the transition from a socialist economic system to a market
economy will entail rising inequality, and there is support for that view in recent compilations of
distributional data for the 1980s and '90s (Milanovic, 1996; Ravallion and Chen, 1997).
However, these compilations are typically based on the tabulations of distributional data (drawn
from household surveys) that are made available by official sources.  While economic reforms
often have important implications for the methods used in measuring economic welfare and
inequality, government statistical agencies may not be adjusting as rapidly as one would like to the
structural changes going on in the economy.  And users of the official data rarely probe into the
raw micro data underlying the distributional comparisons being made, either because of lack of
access to the data or lack of resources for doing so.
Could lags in reforming statistical methods entail substantial biases in assessments of how
inequality is changing during the transition?  The structural changes going on are not necessarily
inequality-increasing.  A common element of socialist economic planning was the suppression of
food-staple prices, to help finance industrialization. 2 Through market liberalization, the transition
typically entails higher food staple prices. To the extent that food-staple producers are
concentrated among the poor, the transition will put downward pressure on inequality.  If all
incomes were derived from market exchange then these effects should be seen quickly in official
data on distribution drawing on household surveys. However, a large share of income in poor
rural economies takes the form of direct consumption of own production. Valuations must be
2  This vvas  often  referred  to as the "price scissors"  and there is a large literature  on the practice;
for a recent analysis  and references  see Sah and Stiglitz  (1992).
2imputed for this and other income sources which were not acquired through exchange.  When
prices are controlled by administrative fiat, the same prices are naturally used for valuation.  But
there can be no assurance that old administrative prices will be replaced by market prices as the
transition proceeds.  Unless statistical agencies are quick enough to adapt to such changes, biases
can enter survey-based analyses of (among other things) income inequality.
The transition can have many other implications for measurement.  The level of prices may
rise faster in some regions of the economy than others after reforms (reflecting nontraded goods,
or less than perfect spatial market integration, due for instance to poorly developed transportation).
If it were the initially better-off regions which saw higher growth and higher inflation (due to
higher aggregate demand locally) then assessments of income distribution which ignored
geographic differences in prices could overestimate the rate at which inequality was increasing.
There is no good a priori reason to assume that there will be a bias, or that (when there is)
it could go only one way.  For example, the share of income from undervalued components may
be no different between the rich and poor, or the rate of inflation may be higher in poorer regions.
These are empirical questions, although they can be difficult to answer since they require access
to, and reprocessing of, the raw data underlying official tabulations.
This paper addresses these concerns in the context of post-reform rural China. Beginning
with Premier Deng's reforms in 1978, China's rural economy became market-oriented; prices were
freed and the farm-household replaced the commune as the decision-making unit.  These reforms
brought about changes to data collection, including greater reliance on household surveys. The
scope and collection methods of such surveys improved significantly during the 1980s, starting
with the Rural Household Survey (RHS) introduced in 1984. This has been the main source of
3data for distributional analysis on rural China.
Tabulations of results from the RHS in China's Statistical Yearbooks have suggested rising
income inequality since the mid-i 980s. This has been widely reported and attracted much
attention?  However, there are reasons to be cautious in interpreting the available evidence on
income inequality in rural China. A number of potential problems have been identified in recent
literature, including the undervaluation of income in kind from the consumption of own-farm
products due to continuing reliance on planning prices for valuation purposes. 4
We examine how the problems in official tabulations from the household survey data have
affected measurements of the overall level of inequality, and how it changes over time.  We also
examine how these data problems impinge on explanations of the observed changes in overall
inequality. 5 Suppose, for example, that we want to know if the rising income inequality in China
is due to the booming rural non-farm sector (including the famous Township and Village
Enterprises).  Or we may want to see what role public and private transfers played.  In principle,
the answers to such questions will depend on the method used to measure incomes at the
household level.  For example, undervaluing income in kind from own production might lead one
to underestimate the contribution of this income component to rising income inequality, given that
3  See, for example,  the front page article in The New York  Times, December  27, 1995.
'  Discussions  of the problems  can be found in World  Bank (1992),  Khan  et al. (1993)  and Chen
and Ravallion  (1996).
5  There have  been a number  of studies  attempting  to throw light on the causes  of inequality  in
China since reforms  began in the late 1970s. Decompositions  have been done along  various dimensions
(geographic  and by income source)  and at various levels  of spatial aggregation  (some  by county,  some by
village, some  household)  and for differing  time dimensions  (some  using single  cross-sectional  surveys,
some including  comparisons  over time). Contributions  include  Knight and Song  (1993),  Rozelle  (1994)
and Howes and Hussain  (1994).
4its progressive  undervaluation  over time would  probably  lead one to conclude  (incorrectly)  that
this income component  is becoming  less covariate  with total income. It is an empirical  question
just how robust explanations  of rising inequality  are to these data  problems.
We address  these issues  using a large  household-level  data set for rural China  spanning  the
period 1985-90. The region  we study embraces  booming  Guangdong  on the coast (the province
surrounding  Hong Kong) and the far less prosperous,  and more economicly  stagnant,  inland
provinces  of Guangxi,  Yunnan  and Guizhou. Having  access  to the micro data means that we can
attempt  to correct  the main concerns  about existing  distributional  data. After  making  corrections
to the processing,  we are able to use the survey  to address  a number  of questions  about  the
proximate  causes of the observed  changes  in income  inequality.
The following  section  summarizes  the theoretical  results we will be using from the
literature  on inequality  measurement.  Section  3 then looks at the theoretical  implications  of
undervaluing  an income component  for measures  of inequality  and their decomposition.  In
section  4 we describe  our data,  while section  5 gives our overall  results  on income inequality,  with
and without  our corrections  to the data  processing. We then turn in section  6 to the task of
explaining  the observed  changes  in inequality. Our conclusions  are summarized  in section  7.
2  Inequality  measurement  and decomposition  methods
A measure  of inequality  can be written  in generic  form:
I  = I(y  1/A Y2/R . ... YNIR )(1
where  y, is the i'th person's income  in a population  of size N, and 1 is mean income. We assume
5that this measure is continuous, symmetric (swapping incomes does not change the measure),
normalized such that inequality is zero when all persons have the same income, and that the
measure satisfies the "transfer axiom" such that a transfer from rich to poor reduces inequality.
For some sorts of distributional comparisons we may not need to know any more about the
measure of inequality.  For example, if the Lorenz curve (giving, on the vertical axis, the share of
total income held by the poorest x% of the population) for distribution A is everywhere above that
of B then all inequality measures in the above class of measures will show higher inequality in B
than A (Atkinson, 1970).
In our empirical work we will focus on two special cases of the above class of measures.
The first is the well-known Gini index (G), given by the (household-size weighted) mean absolute
deviation between all pairs of per capita household incomes.  The second is a member of the
Generalized Entropy class of additively decomposable measures, namely the average log deviation
of incomes from their mean: 6
LD  =  - log(i  /Y 1)  (2)
N
We will also be interested in explaining inequality and its changes over time.  There are
potentially many ways of decomposing a change in inequality by income source.  Here we follow
a strand of the theoretical literature which has constrained the choices by postulating certain
6  If N stood instead  for the number  of households  then household-size  weights  would appear  in
this formula. All statistics  in this paper  which are based on the household-level  data have been
household-size  weighted.
6axioms that are deemed desirable for any decomposition.  (We only summarize the basic results
that will be needed for the empirical work later.)
Let total income (per person) be divided into m categories, such that, for the i'th
household:
m
Yi  kE  Yik  (3) k=  1
If these components were uncorrelated with each other, and one measured inequality by the
squared coefficient of variation (CV), then the natural decomposition would be to measure the
contribution of each income component to inequality by its squared CV. However, in practice
different income sources are correlated to varying extents.  And there are many other inequality
measures that one might want to consider besides squared CV.  How then should one apportion
total inequality between components?
A powerful result proved by Shorrocks (1982) shows that a modified version of the
squared-CV decomposition (allowing for non-zero correlations) can also be defended as a
decomposition method for a wide range of inequality measures. For the class of inequality
measures described above,7 Shorrocks shows that the proportion of total inequality contributed by
the k'th income source is given by:
cov(yV,y)  rks
Ck  =  4=k 
k  var(y)  s
'  In fact Shorrocks  proves  the following  result  for an even larger  class of measures;  see his paper
for full details.
7where rk  is the correlation  coefficient  with  total income  and  Sk and s are the standard  deviation  of
the k'th income  component  and of total income  respectively.  Note that Ck sums  to one over all k
and is simply  the ordinary  least squares  regression  coefficient  of  Yk ony.  The decomposition  based
on (4) is independent  of the precise  measure  of inequality  used (within  the aforementioned  class of
measures).
Notice that the contribution  of any income  component  to total inequality  depends  on both
the variance  of that component  (relative  to the variance  in total income)  and its correlation
coefficient  with total income. So the fact  that some income  component  contributes  a lot to total
inequality  does not necessarily  mean  that it is itself very unequally  distributed;  it may instead  be
highly correlated  with total income,  yet quite equally  distributed. Similarly,  a highly unequally
distributed  income  component  may contribute  little to total inequality  because  it is roughly
uncorrelated  with total income,  or it may  be inequality-reducing  because  of a negative  correlation
with total income.
The above  result holds for a decomposition  of the level of inequality. What about changes
in inequality  over time? Building  on the Shorrocks'  decomposition,  we follow  Jenkins (1995)  and
Fields (1996)  in calculating  the contribution  of the k'th income  source  to the change  in total
inequality  between  dates 1 and 2 by:
k2I2  kl I(5)
12 -II I2  1,
which  sums to one. Notice  that (unlike  the levels decomposition)  this decomposition  will depend
on the specific  inequality  measure  used. We will compare  results  for the Gini index with  those for
8the average  log deviation  given  by (2).
One can also ask how  much of the level of inequality  or its change  over time is due to
some  variable  determining  income  through  a stochastic  process.  To do so, replace  equation  (3)
with a regression  model  for income:
m
Y=  3kik  (6)
where  xik  is the k'th asset (xi. can be taken to be an error term,  with pm=l). Following  Fields
(1996),  the contribution  of the k'th explanatory  variable  to total inequality  is given by:
Pkcov(Xk,  Y)
k  var(y)
This is simply  the product  of the partial regression  coefficient  of income  on schooling  (holding  all
other  variables  constant)  with that total regression  coefficient  of schooling  on income (holding
nothing  else constant). The contributions  of each asset to the changes  over time can then  be
determined  using equation  (5). The precise  decomposition  will naturally  depend  on the regression
specification  in (6).  This should  be borne  in mind when interpreting  the results.
3  Effects of valuation  errors  on measured  inequality  and its decomposition
It is known  that inequality  measures  can be highly sensitive  to measurement  errors; a few
bad observations  can have a large impact  on measured  inequality  (Cowbell  and Victoria-Fester,
1996). Here we are concerned  with a particular  structure  of measurement  error,  arising  from
9undervaluation  of an income  component,  as discussed  in the introduction. We cannot  find a
treatment  of this case in the literature,  so we offer  some  observations,  to help interpret  the
empirical  results  later. We examine  effects  of undervaluation  on the level of inequality,  the factor
decomposition  of inequality,  and on the decomposition  of changes  in inequality  over time.
Let us first consider  the effect  of the valuation  error on the level of measured  inequality,  as
this is the easiest  case. The revaluation  can be thought  of as a negative  income tax. Let the
average  rate  of revaluation  (analogous  to the average  tax rate) be defined  as the increase  in
imputed  value as a proportion  of original  income. Following  results  from the literature  on tax
progressivity  (see, for example,  Pfingsten,  1988),  the correction  for undervaluation  will lead to
lower (higher)  measured  inequality  if the average  rate of revaluation  falls  (rises)  as income
increases.
What about  the effect on the factor decomposition  of inequality? Recall  that the share  of
inequality  attributed  to a given  income component  is the regression  coefficient  of that component
on total income (equation  4). Both the regressor  and regressand  are underestimated  (by the same
amount). There will be two sources  of bias in the regression  coefficient;  the first is the usual
attenuation  bias due to miss-measurement  of the regressor,  while  the second  is the bias due to the
fact that the same error contaminates  the regressand. These  two biases will work in opposite
directions  and so one cannot  say on a priori grounds  what effect  this will have on the regression
coefficient.  Intuitively,  the lower  the regression  coefficient,  the less important  will be the second
source of bias. So one expects  undervaluation  to lead to underestimation  of the contribution  to
inequality  when that contribution  is sufficiently  low.
We can derive  a very simple  sufficient  condition  for signing  the effect  when the k'th
10income component is undervalued by a constant proportion, such that the revaluation yields:
Yk = (1 + a)yk  (8)
for a>0.  We assume that  1  > ck>  0 , although this can be relaxed; the following result holds for
1 +1/a>  c  >  -(1  + a 2vd/(2a)wherevk  -var(ydlvar(y).  On revaluing the undervalued
component, its contribution to total inequality becomes:
COV(Yk'Y)  (  +a)(Ck  + avd
kV  var(y  )  +a  vk  + 2ac
From (9) it is readily verified that c**  > ck if and only if k  k
(2 ck  - I)ck
k  I  + a(l  -ck)
So a sufficient condition for the undervaluation to underestimate the contribution to inequality is
that the undervalued component of income accounts for less than one half of inequality.
The effect of undervaluation on a factor's contribution to changes in inequality over time
(yk  given by equation 5) is more complicated, since it will clearly also depend on how the factor
decomposition evolves. We confine attention to the case of empirical interest later in which
inequality is increasing (with or without revaluation) and the undervalued income component's
11contribution  to inequality  is underestimated.  Let  *  denote  the contribution  of the k'th income
component  to rising inequality. It is readily  verified  that:
*  (kl  Ck;)  + (C  -k2)I2],I*  + [(Ck;  - ckYl)  + (ck2  - k;) 2 ] 2 2
Tk  7 yk  (I2  - I1)(I2*  -I,)  (11)
If the factor decomposition  does not change  over time (c  c *  and c  =c  ) then clearly
k2  ki  k2  Ckl)te  lal
*  = ct  -- C*]  = c  - c*  <  ;the  undervaluation  ofthe k'th income component  also leads to
Yk-'k  =  ki  .Cki  =k2  k2
an underestimation  of its contribution  to rising inequality. However, the outcome  is ambiguous
when the factor decomposition  is changing  over time.  From (11), the sign  of  - will also
depend  on the "cross-terms",  c  ck2 and ck2  c  at least one of which  must be positive.! A
sufficient  condition  for ye > yk is that:
c  -c  I  c
k2  kI  <  2  Ckl  kI  (12)
c * - cII  * -c| k2  k2  k  k2l
However,  it is entirely  possible  for revaluation  to diminish  the contribution  of the undervalued
income component  to rising inequality,  even  when revaluation  yields higher inequality  at any one
s  The cross terms cannot both be negative, for then (c  ckl)  + (c 2 - ck2) < 0 - a
contradiction.
12date. Suppose,  for example,  that with its undervaluation  the measured  contribution  to inequality  of
the k'th income component  does not change  over time  (ck2  =Cki  ), but with the revaluation  its
contribution  is found to fall over time (Ck* < ck  i).  Then  *  > y  if and only if  I2*/I* >
(Ckl  -CkY)(Ck;  ck2)
4  Data
The data are the household-level  data from the Rural  Household  Survey  (RHS)  done by
China's State Statistics  Bureau  (SSB). Our sample  covers  9,500 rural  households  in Guangxi,
Yunnan,  Guizhou  and Guangdong.  The survey  and steps  we have  taken in data processing  are
described  in detail in Chen  and Ravallion  (1996). The RHS is a high quality survey  in many
respects,  including  both sampling  methods  and the care taken to minimize  nonsampling  errors
through  close supervision  and regular  visits  to the sampled  households. There are, however,
problems  in the methods  used in processing  the data after its collection,  leading up to the
tabulations  found in the Statistical  Yearbook  for China.  Chen  and Ravallion  (1996)  review  the
main concerns  about  these data. We attempt  to resolve  the main problems  by reprocessing  the
primary  data for 1985-90.
An important  concern  about  the official  data is that they continued  to rely on old planning
prices for the valuation  of income-in-kind  from consumption  of own-farm  production. These
prices  were below  market  prices (and also below  government  procurement  prices).  This
undervalued  a large component  of income  - notably  non-marketed  home  production  of grain  - and
13at a rising rate over time (Chen and Ravallion, 1996). The standard definitions indicate that, for
our data set, an average of 21% of income came from grain production, of which 80% was the
imputed value of consumption from own production.  Other components of farm income appear
also to have been undervalued, but this is a less worrying since the shares of income involved are
smaller (22% of income came from non-grain farm output, but only 10% of this was from own
consumption).  Another problem is that the incomes used in past work have not included imputed
rents for housing and durables. Past work has also ignored spatial differences in the cost of living.
To deal with these problems, we have revalued grain-income in kind at median local
(county-level) selling prices for grain, as determined from the primary household-level data. 9 The
administrative prices conventionally used by SSB for valuation were 72% of median selling price
in 1985, and this had fallen to 48% by 1990. We have also imputed rents for housing and
consumer durables, based on the asset valuations available in the primary survey data; we used
five percent of the recorded dwelling value for housing and 10 percent for durables (Chen and
Ravallion, 1996). And we have constructed new province-level spatial and inter-temporal cost of
living indices. The spatial cost of living adjustment is based on poverty lines aiming to measure
the local cost in 1988 of the same standard of living everywhere, based on a common bundle of
foods and an allowance for non-food spending consistent with spending behavior at the food
poverty line.  The inter-temporal price indices are based on the rural CPI, though we have changed
the weights to accord with consumption behavior of the poorest 30% of the population. Full details
on both the poverty lines and the intertemporal cost-of-living deflators can be found in Chen and
9 Similar  data are unavailable  for revaluing  other components  of income in kind from own-farm
production,  although  (as noted  above)  these  appear  to be minor.
14Ravallion (1996).'°
To assess the contribution of these data adjustments, we give results for each of the three
income definitions: The first is SSB's "net income" measure direct from the data files.  We call
this "original income."  The second incorporates our revaluation of grain-income from own
production, and imputed rents.  The third uses our new deflator as well.
We use household income per person.  This does not allow for economies of scale in
household consumption.  It is often argued that scale economies are small in low-income
countries, because the share of income devoted to collectively consumed goods within the
household tends to be small, although this assumption is questioned by Lanjouw and Ravallion
(1995). We will consider the implications for some of our main results of allowing for scale
economies, and examine how this is affected by the other data revisions.
All our inequality measures, and other statistics, assume equality within the household (in
terms of income per person, or income per equivalent single person), and are household size
weighted.  The Gini indices were calculated by numerical integration using the trapezoidal rule) of
the empirical (household-level) Lorenz curve.
5  Results  on the overall level of inequality
Figure 1 plots the proportionate change in income after all out data revisions against the
log of original (unadjusted) income for 1985 and 1990. The fitted line was obtained by locally-
'0 A remaining  limitation  of these price indices  is that the same deflators  are used for all income
groups  in a given  province  and year.  Depending  on how much  budget  shares  vary by income  level, and
how  much relative  prices  change  over time, this limitation  could also have bearing  on both the level of
measured  inequality  and its evolution  over time.
15weighted smoothing (using the "KSM" program in STATA). The figure also gives the fitted
values for the increase in income attributable to grain revaluation alone, as well as the remainder
due to other changes noted above.  (The scatter of data points is for the total income increase due
to data revisions.)
The proportionate change due to our data revisions tends to decrease as income increases,
indicating that inequality falls after the changes. It is clear from Figure 1 that the revaluation of
grain income in kind accounts for the bulk of the change, although the other changes are also
inequality reducing on their own.  The revaluation rates tend to be higher in 1990 than 1985,
largely reflecting the rising divergence between market prices and planning prices.
Table 1 gives our estimates of two measures of income inequality over time. Both
measures show rising inequality over the period for all three definitions of income.  The
magnitude of the increase is markedly less when one combines the new valuation methods with
the new cost of living deflator.  This can be seen more clearly from Figure 2.  The adjustments to
the data entail lower inequality, and a lower rate of increase in inequality.
The finding of lower inequality when our revisions are made to the income data is robust to
the choice of inequality measure.  This can be seen in Figure 3 and 4, which give the Lorenz
curves before and after the data revisions, for 1985 and 1990 respectively.  Figures 5 and 6 give
the Lorenz curves for 1985 and 1990, based on the original and revised incomes (using the new
valuation method, and new deflator).  There is Lorenz dominance in both cases, so the conclusion
that inequality increased is also robust to the inequality measure used.  With the revisions to the
primary income data, however, the two Lorenz curves have clearly converged considerably.
Figure 7 allow us to examine the effect on the inequality comparisons of introducing an
16allowance  for scale economies. Instead  of income  per capita  we use income divided  by n  0where
n is household  size and 0 is a parameter  between  0 and 1 interpretable  as (minus one times)  the
elasticity of the cost of living with respect  to household  size.  The conclusion  that the Gini index
of income inequality  rose over the period  is robust  to the choice  of 0.  So is the conclusion  that the
inequality  is lower  after making  our revisions  to the raw data, at any given  value of 0.
6  Inequality  decompositions
Our aim here  is not to attempt  an exhaustive  explanation  of inequality  in rural China, but
rather  to test sensitivity  to the measurement  problems. For this purpose,  we decompose  income
into the 14 sources  in Table  2. These  are largely  self-explanatory.  The category  "joint costs"
allows  for costs which we cannot  apportion  between  factor income  components. Table  3 gives  the
average  shares  of income  attributed  to these 14 sources. As expected,  the revaluation  of grain-
income  in kind entails a sizable  increase  in the share  of income  attributed  to this component. On
average,  21% of SSB's income measure  is attributed  to grain,  while this rises to 31% on revaluing
at average  local selling  prices. The new income  component  for imputed  rents accounts  for about
7% of income on average.
Tables  4 gives  the source  decomposition  of the levels of inequality  at the beginning  and
end of the period for the three income  definitions. When  compared  to the original  incomes,  the
new valuation  methods  entail a sizable  increase  in the share  of inequality  attributed  to grain
incomes,  from 6% to 14%  in 1990. Notice  that, while  the new valuation  methods  indicate  lower
inequality  (Table  3), they also indicate  that grain  income  is more  covariate  with total income,  and
17hence it is found to account for a higher share of the (lower) level of inequality.  These two
findings are consistent.  On the one hand, grain income from own production accounts for a larger
share of the incomes of the poor, and this is why its revaluation tends to reduce measured
inequality.  On the other hand, better-off rural households tend to have higher incomes from grain
production (even though the share of income from this source is lower).  Since the undervaluation
is in the output price, it acts like a constant proportionate mark-down of this component as in
section 3, where it was shown that the undervaluation of grain income will then lead to an
underestimation of the share of inequality attributed to this component of income as long as that
share is less than 0.5, as is the case here (see the figures for grain in Table 4).
Table 4 also gives the shares of the measured increase in both inequality measures which
are attributed to each component of income. Over the period, the revaluation of own-grain
consumption entails a large increase in the share of rising inequality which is attributed this
component.  (It is readily verified from Tables 1 and 4 that for grain the second inequality in (12)
holds for the Gini index but the first does not, although the difference is small; both inequalities in
(12) hold for grain when using the log deviation.) The usual income definition used in data for
China suggests that income from collectives (including TVEs) was the most important single
factor in the increase in overall inequality (Table 4).  Our definition points instead to grain income.
Using our revised incomes (both revaluing grain income and using the new deflator) our
results indicate that 104% of the increase in the Gini index over the period 1985-90 can be
attributed to grain income; 61% was attributable to income from collectives (including TVEs).
Smaller positive contributions to rising inequality came from self-employment in industry and
construction (42%), labor earnings (36%) and services (32%).  Against these positive contributions
18to rising inequality, there were large inequality-decreasing effects from private transfers (-131% of
the increase in inequality) and other farm income (-65%).
Turning to the decomposition in terms of assets, we postulate that incomes are determined
by the variables given in Table 5.  The dependent variable is income per person, in constant prices.
"Fixed productive assets" comprise the survey valuations of all immobile productive farm assets,
expressed in constant prices using the same deflator as the dependent variable, and normalized by
household size. "Labor force per capita" is the number of able-bodied workers per capita in the
household. The variables "hilly area" and "mountainous area" are dummy variables for the
geographic area in which the household lives, and the omitted dummy variable is that for
households living on the plains.  "Cultivated land," "hilly land" and "fishpond" land are all areas
of land owned or contracted per person in the household.  The education variables are all dummy
variables for the highest level of education reached by the workforce in the household; the omitted
dummy variable is for a household in which all members are illiterate.  We also include household
size as an independent variable, to allow for possible scale economies.
Table 5 gives the regression coefficients for 1985 and 1990, for both SSB's original
incomes and our adjusted incomes (revaluing grain and using the new deflator).  The signs are
unsurprising, and almost all coefficients are significant. By both measures, the income gain from
higher fixed productive assets fell over the period 1985-90, while the returns to land and schooling
(except college) rose.
Table 6 gives the simple correlation coefficients between each explanatory variable in the
regressions and total income per capita.  These will help in interpreting the inequality
decompositions in Table 7 (analogous to Table 4).
19A large share of the measured inequality at one date is attributable to the regression
residual (Table 7); the values of R2 in Table 6 are not unusually low for household-level cross-
sectional regressions of this sort, but the unexplained component of the variance in incomes still
accounts for 70-80% or more of the level of inequality.  The residuals also account (positively) for
a share of the change in inequality over time.
In terms of the asset decomposition, the biggest quantitative difference between the two
income measures is in the estimated contribution of fixed farm assets to the change in inequality.
Both measures suggest that this was inequality-reducing over the period. This is largely
attributable to this factor's declining regression coefficient; the proportionate drops in the P
coefficient on fixed productive assets in the income regressions (Table 5) are roughly the same as
the drops in the shares of inequality (Table 7). Thus, the key factor appears to have been the lower
"rate of return" to farm assets in 1990 than 1985. One might conjecture that wider access to
capital in rural China during the 1980s helped reduce its returns.  The reason why SSB's original
incomes appear to have underestimated the (inequality-reducing) contribution of wider access to
physical capital is that SSB's income measures underestimated the rate of return to these assets in
the base period.  This is undoubtedly due to the undervaluation of grain income, leading to an
underestimation of the marginal product of the farm capital stock.
Living in a mountainous area (relative to the plains, where farm land tends to be of better
quality) was an important factor in explaining the level of inequality and an important source of
rising inequality over time.  Access to cultivated land was of negligible consequence for the level
of inequality, but our adjustments to SSB's original incomes suggest that access to farm land was
a more important source of higher inequality over time than one would have otherwise thought.
20This too is attributable in part to the increase in returns to land indicated by our corrections to the
primary data.  (Notice the large increase between 1985 and 1990 in the regression coefficient on
cultivated land in Table 5, when based on our revised incomes; by contrast the original incomes
indicate a small drop.)  With our data revisions the correlation between land and income also
increased (Table 6), adding further to its contribution to inequality.  The revaluation of grain
income in kind is clearly the main factor here too.
Both income measures (with and without our corrections) indicate that living in the
mountains versus the plains was an important source of inequality, and a very important factor in
the increase in inequality.  Indeed, the distribution of households between mountainous areas and
the plains accounts for 52% of the increase in the Gini index using our adjusted incomes (33%
using SSB's original incomes.) Although fishponds only accounted for less than 2% of the level
of inequality in 1990, they accounted for a sizable share of the increase in inequality, reflecting
both a higher ,B  in 1990 than 1985 (Table 5) and a higher correlation with total income (Table 6).
The importance of the geographic variables to how distribution evolves over time is
consistent with the results of Jalan and Ravallion (1997) on these data.  They found that rates of
consumption growth over time at the farm-household level are strongly influenced by geographic
variables, controlling for household characteristics. This can be interpreted as a "geographic
poverty trap" arising from the combined effect of credit market failure and an adverse effect of
mountainous terrain and other geographic variables on the productivity of private investment.
Primary education was inequality-reducing, while other levels of education had the
opposite effect, although the contribution was small in all cases (negligible in the case of college).
Recall that we find increases in the O's for the (non-college) education variables in Table 5.  Lack
21of schooling beyond primary is negatively correlated with income (Table 6), so the higher returns
put downward pressure on inequality.  By contrast, the large increase in the returns to high school
education put upward pressure on inequality, although this effect was dampened by an
improvement in the distribution of high school education; the correlation coefficient fell slightly
(Table 6) and  the standard deviation also fell (by 7%).)  In terms of the impact on inequality, a
more equal distribution of secondary schooling helped compensate for its higher rate of return.
7  Conclusions
Tabulations of the distribution of rural incomes provided in the Statistical Yearbooks for
China suggest a large increase in inequality after the mid-1980s.  However, there are a number of
concerns about the data underlying these numbers, as well as the level of their aggregation. While
China's rural economy has been going through a structural transition, the processing methods used
in the available survey data have not fully reflected those changes.  Income in kind from the
consumption of farm products has been systematically undervalued in official sources, due to a
large and rising divergence in the 1980s between the prices used in official valuations and actual
selling prices. Another concern is that existing data sources have ignored spatial differences in the
cost of living, and how these have changed over time.  Before we can be confident that there is in
fact rising income inequality, these concems should be addressed.  Thankfully, one can go a long
way toward fixing the main problems if one has access to the raw data from China's  Rural
"  Recall  that the share of inequality  attributed  to any income  determinant  is the product  of three
things:  the partial  regression  coefficient  of income  on that determinant,  the simple  correlation  coefficient
with income,  and the ratio of the standard  deviation  of that determinant  relative  to the standard  deviation
of income.
22Household Survey, which appear to be of good quality by international standards.
We find that about two thirds of the proportionate increase in measured income inequality
in rural southern China between 1985 and 1990 vanishes once one revalues own-grain production
at average local selling prices, imputes rents for housing and consumer durables, and allows for
inter-provincial cost of living differences. After making these changes in the measured incomes at
household level, instead of the 16% increase in the Gini index of income inequality between 1985
and 1990 implied by past data, we find a 6% increase; instead of a 36% increase in the average
proportionate deviation from the mean, we find a 12% increase.
The undervaluation of income in kind from foodgrain production in the official data is the
main source of bias in past inequality measures. This component of income tends to account for a
higher share of the incomes of the poor, so its undervaluation leads to an overestimation of the
level of inequality.  Furthermore, the prices used by the provincial statistics offices diverged
progressively over time from market prices, with the result that the undervaluation also leads to an
overestimation of the rate of increase in inequality.
What accounts for the measured increase in inequality not accountable to these data
problems?  The explanation depends on the income definition used.  The revaluation of income in
kind from gain production indicates that a much larger share of the (albeit smaller) increase in
rural inequality was due to grain income than past data would have suggested.  The income
definition used in past work suggests that differing fortunes in grain production account for 15%
of the rise in the Gini index; on revaluing grain income-in-kind at actual selling prices we find that
this income component accounted for 58% of the increase in the Gini index. Private transfers
were the strongest inequality-reducing factor amongst the income components we have measured.
23We also estimated a decomposition of inequality in terms of land and (physical and
human) assets.  This suggests that the differences in income between those living in mountainous
rural areas and those on the plains have been an important source of rising inequality, while
diminishing returns entailed that the distribution of farm assets was inequality-reducing, once our
corrections are made to measured incomes.  Higher returns over time to good quality agricultural
land (including whether one lives in the plains or the mountains) were inequality-increasing, even
though the distribution of land was of little consequence to the level of inequality at any one date.
There are still problems in the data that we have not been able to deal with here, and at
present it is only possible for us to perform these calculations for rural areas of four provinces.
Nor have we addressed two other potential sources of rising inequality nationally, namely
inequality between urban and rural areas, and inequality within urban areas.  There are a number
of as yet unresolved issues here, not least of which is allowing for differences in the cost of living
between urban and rural areas (adjusting for inflation over time using separate urban and rural
consumer price indices does not incorporate the spatial difference at any one point in time).  A
further problem is obtaining a definition of income which is comparable between urban and rural
areas of China; the rural and urban household surveys for China are largely independent and there
appear to be a number of inconsistencies.  Reprocessing of the raw survey data for both the urban
and rural household surveys for all provinces could go a long way toward dealing with these
issues.
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26Table 1: Income  inequality  measures  for southern  China
Inequality  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
measure (%)
1.  Original  measure  Gini  29.11  30.12  31.04  32.96  33.75  33.90
of household  net
income,  as used in
the Statistical  Year-  Log deviation  13.97  14.92  15.82  17.84  18.82  18.96
book for China
...............................................................................................................................................................
2. With  new  Gini  27.47  28.75  29.46  30.57  31.10  30.88
valuation  methods
(for income  from
own-grain  production  Log deviation  12.38  13.55  14.16  15.26  15.85  15.50
and imputed rents)  ...  ... and  imputed  rents)  ~~~~.................................  ......................................  ...........................................................................................................
3. New valuation  Gini  27.06  28.27  28.34  28.12  28.03  28.72
methods  plus new
cost-of-living  Log deviation  12.02  13.11  13.14  12.96  12.93  13.43
deflatorsTable 2: Components of rural household income
1. Collective: Income from collective businesses (collective united accounting units, TVE,
economic union)
2. Grain: Grain income
3. Non-grain farm: Non-grain farming income
4.  Animal: Income from animal husbandry
5.  Other farm: Forestry, fishery, handicrafts and gathering & hunting
6.  Industry: Income from industry and construction (small business or self employer)
7. Services: Income from transportation, commerce, restaurant, service and other (small business
or self employer)
8.  Labor: Private sector labor earnings
9.  State:  Wages and pensions from state or collective own enterprises
10: Public transfers: Public transfers (government or village subsidies, bonuses and disaster
release finds)
11. Private transfers: Gifts or remittances from family members or relatives living outside the
village (in rural or urban areas) for more than six months per year (those living outside the village
for less than six months are counted as household members)
12. Other income: Other factor income
13. Reut: Imputed rent on housing and durable goods
14. Joint costs: Joint costs of production which cannot be apportioned (tax, contract fee and the
depreciation of fixed productive asset)Table 3: Average income by source
Shares of 6-year mean income (%)
Original  With new  New valuation
incomes  valuation  methods plus
methods  new deflator
Collective  3.01  2.37  2.26
Grain  21.12  31.11  31.48
Non-grain farm  22.27  17.58  17.61
Animal  17.82  14.03  14.09
Other farm  11.05  8.75  8.75
Industry  4.22  3.31  3.27
Services  7.31  5.75  5.68
Labor  8.83  6.91  6.78
State  2.43  1.92  1.93
Public transfers  2.74  2.16  2.15
Private transfers  2.97  2.36  2.30
Other income  1.40  1.10  1.09
Rent  n.a.  6.72  6.68
Joint costs  -5.17  -4.07  -4.06
100.00  100.00  100.00Table 4: Factor decomposition of income inequality
Original  incomes  New valuation  methods  New valuations  + new deflator
1985  1990  1985-90  1985  1990  1985-90  ,  1985  1990  1985-90
Gini  LD  Gini  LD  Gini  LD
Collective  7.20  12.57  45.20  27.60  6.43  10.23  40.81  25.29,  6.40  9.92  67.34  39.95
Grain  4.42  5.97  15.42  10.32  8.34  13.83  58.12  35.65s  8.77  14.25  103.55  60.95
Non-grain  farn  17.31  19.74  34.52  26.55  15.46  16.48  24.71  20.53  15.51  16.63  34.91  26.19
Animal  12.37  11.16  3.83  7.78  11.04  9.84  0.12  5.05  11.04  10.33  -1.26  4.27
Other  farm  14.52  9.77  -19.08  -3.52  11.97  7.69  -26.82  -9.31  11.70  7.25  -65.31  -30.70
Industry  4.84  8.41  30.10  18.40  4.27  6.75  26.71  16.58,  4.39  6.58  42.32  25.27
Services  12.30  14.30  26.46  19.90  10.42  11.50  20.14  15.75  10.57  11.80  31.93  22.33
Labor  7.15  10.10  28.02  18.36  6.32  8.67  27.62  18.00  6.22  7.93  35.82  22.51
State  3.43  3.29  2.44  2.89  3.03  2.70  0.05  1.40  3.10  2.99  1.25  2.08
Public  transfers  5.20  3.77  -4.88  -0.21  4.51  3.19  -7.42  -2.04  4.43  3.20  -16.76  -7.24
Private  transfers  13.14  3.86  -52.53  -22.12  11.86  3.35  -65.24  -30.44  11.63  3.40  -130.80  -66.78
Other  income  2.42  2.76  4.84  3.72  2.05  2.29  4.23  3.24  2.09  2.25  4.86  3.62
Rent  n..a.  n..a.  n..a.  n..a.  8.18  8.42  10.34  9.36  8.07  8.28  11.76  10.10
Joint costs  -4.27  -5.69  -14.32  -9.67  -3.89  -4.94  -13.36  -9.09  -3.90  -4.80  -19.60  -12.54
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00
Note: The figures under "1985" and "1990" give the factor decomposition of the level of inequality.  The figures under 1985-90 give the
decomposition of the change in inequality using the Gini index and mean log deviation (LD).Table 5: Regressions for real income per capita
Variable  Original  income  With  new  valuation  methods  and
new  deflator
. 1985  1990  1985  1990
Intercept  333.02  420.33  401.91  463.38
(23.52)  (23.99)  (27.60)  (29.82)
Fixed  productive  assets  per  capita  0.32  0.18  0.36  0.21
(24.36)  (17.01)  (26.35)  (19.47)
Household  size  -14.96  -21.30  -16.48  -24.08
(-12.33)  (-14.38)  (-13.21)  (-18.33)
Household  labor  force  per  capita  155.69  126.55  181.50  147.89
(able  to work,  if notworking)  (12.98)  (9.91)  (14.71)  (13.05)
Hilly  area (dummy  variable  for  -74.48  -101.67  -93.30  -89.485
the locality  of the  household)  (-12.22)  (-13.42)  (-14.88)  (-13.32)
Mountainous  area  (dummy  -144.39  -201.73  -175.19  -191.74
variable,  as above)  (-24.48)  (-29.43)  (-28.88)  (-31.57)
Owned  cultivated  land  area  per  0.14  0.13  0.17  0.33
capita  (6.90)  (3 77)  (8.41)  (10.89)
Area  of  hilly  land  per  capita  -o.o  1  -0.002  -0.004  0.01
(-1.45)  (-0.15)  (-0.92)  (0.80)
Area  of fishpond  land  per  capita  0.08  1.27  0.07  0.89
(2.96)  (14.40)  (2.53)  (11.40)
Highest  education  level  is  38.00  50.90  36.64  49.56
...  primary  school  (3.87)  (3.93)  (3.63)  (4.32)
...  middle  school  78.19  106.90  76.48  97.38
(7.93)  (8.30)  (7.55)  (8.53)
...  high  school  117.57  171.63  115.55  148.20
(10.75)  (12.13)  (10.27)  (11.81)
...  technical  school  133.40  216.59  121.10  193.13
(4.89)  (7.55)  (4.32)  (7.59)
...  college  226.61  253.68  213.28  203.78
(3.43)  (4.43)  (3.14)  (4.02)
R  2  0.185  0.210  0.217  0.247
Note:  Monetary  values  for 1990  are  in 1985  pricesTable 6: Correlation  coefficients  with total income  per capita
Original income  New valuation
methods plus new
deflator
1985  1990  1985  1990
Productive assets  0.24  0.18  0.27  0.23
Household size  -0.04  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05
Labor  0.20  0.15  0.21  0.19
Hilly area  0.05  0.08  0.04  0.09
Mountain  -0.24  0.29  -0.27  -0.30
Cultivated land  0.08  0.05  0.09  0.13
Hilly land  0.00  -0.05  0.00  -0.03
Fishpond  0.06  0.16  0.05  0.13
Primary school  -0.12  -0. 13  -0.12  -0.12
Middle school  I  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.05
High school  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.10
Technical school  0.03  0.05  0.03  0.05
College  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.03Table  7: Decomposition  by income determinants  from  Table 5
Original income  . New valuation  methods  + new deflator
1985  1990  1985-90  1985  1990  1985-90
_____________  Gini  LD  Gini  LD
Productive  assets  5.86  3.45  -11.24  -3.32-  6.68  4.34  -33.82  -15.62
Household  size  0.21  0.36  1.25  0.77.  0.25  0.63  6.81  3.86
Labor  2.42  1.41  -4.74  -1.42.  2.91  2.30  -7.61  -2.88
Hilly area  -0.69  -1.39  -5.67  -3.36.  -0.80  -1.49  -12.88  -7.45
Mountain  7.31  10.96  33.13  21.17  9.47  11.95  52.40  33.10
Cultivated  land  0.53  0.19  -1.86  -0.75.  0.74  1.32  10.85  6.30
Hilly land  0.00  0.01  0.08  0.  04.  0.00  -0.02  -0.35  -0.20
Fishpond  0.12  2.17  14.67  7.93  0.09  1.40  22.79  12.59
Primary  school  -0.94  -1.17  -2.59  -1.82.  -0.85  -1.13  -5.59  -3.46
Middle  school  1.00  1.00  1.04  1.02-  0.92  1.05  3.15  2.15
High school  2.36  2.96  6.60  4.64.  2.20  2.28  3.60  2.97
Technical  school  0.17  0.42  2.00  1.15  0.12  0.42  5.19  2.91
College  0.04  0.14  0.70  0.39-  0.03  0.11  1.34  0.75
Residual  81.61  79.49  66.65  73.58  78.23  76.84  54.13  64.97
100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00'  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00Figure 1: Incidence of Income revisions
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